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Abstract

This paper studies the identification and estimation of treatment response with
heterogeneous spillovers in a network model. We generalize the standard linear-in-means
model to allow for multiple groups with between and within-group interactions. We
provide a set of identification conditions of peer effects and consider a 2SLS estimation
approach. Large sample properties of the proposed estimators are derived. Simulation
experiments show that the estimators perform well in finite samples. The model is used to
study the effectiveness of policies where peer effects are seen as a mechanism through
which the treatments could propagate through the network. When interactions among
groups are at work, a shock on a treated group has effects on the non-treated. Our
framework allows for quantifying how much of the indirect treatment effect is due to
variations in the characteristics of treated peers (treatment contextual effects) and how
much is because of variations in peer outcomes (peer effects).
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Introduction

The program evaluation literature focuses on estimating the program eﬀects without externalities. There is a growing awareness, however, that there may be indirect eﬀects that are
important to measure (see Manski, 2013). Existing methodological contributions as well as
studies collecting empirical evidence are still scarce. In particular, while there are a few papers about the identiﬁcation and estimation of treatment response with interactions (Hudgens
and Halloran, 2008, Miguel and Kremer, 2004 and Sinclair et al., 2012 ), to the best of our
knowledge there are no studies that consider the presence of heterogeneous interactions.
Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009) estimates the indirect eﬀects of the ﬂagship Mexican
welfare program, PROGRESA, on the consumption of ineligible households. This study ﬁnds
that cash transfers to eligible households indirectly increase the consumption of ineligible
households living in the same village. These ﬁndings are clearly very important for designing
policies as well as developing experiments to evaluate them.1 The framework, however, does
not determine how much of the spillover is due to eﬀects from eligible to ineligible subjects,
eﬀects within ineligible (eligible) subjects and feedback eﬀects. It identiﬁes the presence of
indirect eﬀects by comparing outcomes between untreated household in untreated villages and
untreated households in treated villages. When network data are available, the analysis can
be pushed forward and the heterogeneous impact of policies can be modeled and quantiﬁed.
Heterogeneity can be conceived in diﬀerent ways. First, treatment heterogeneity, when the
intensity or type of treatment can diﬀer depending on the treated unit. Second, treatment
eﬀect heterogeneity when the treatment is the same for each agent but its eﬀect is diﬀerent
depending on her characteristics. Third, interaction-driven heterogeneity, when the diﬀusion
of the treatment eﬀect through interactions generates an heterogeneous individual response.
This may be due to both diﬀerences in interaction strengths within and between groups and
to network structure, if data on connections are available. Several papers have focused on the
ﬁrst two types of heterogeneity.2 In this paper we focus on the third kind of heterogeneity.
Using a network approach, our analysis brings three contributions to this literature. First,
we derive analytically the bias that arises if spillovers are ignored. Second, we provide estimands for understanding whether diﬀerent types of untreated - eligible or ineligible- are
diﬀerently impacted by the treatment. Finally, our framework allows us to distinguish between diﬀerent sources of treatment transmission - in particular, how much of the treatment
response is generated by variations in the charactristics of treated peers( treatment contextual
eﬀects) and how much is due to spillovers through outcomes (peer eﬀects). More speciﬁcally,
our paper provides a network-based approach to estimate the average eﬀects of the treatment
in the presence of spillovers on subjects both eligible and ineligible for a program, accounting
for heterogeneous within and between-group spillover eﬀects. We show that heterogeneity in
1

More speciﬁcally, policy interventions should internalize the externalities that they engender, and experiments to evaluate their eﬀectiveness should consider the eﬀects on the entire local economy (e.g. the school,
the village, the city), rather than focusing on diﬀerences between treatment and control group from the same
local entity. When spillovers are at work, both groups’ performance may change.
2
See Imbens and Woolridge (2009) for a revision of recent studies using matching and non-parametric
methodologies to address the second type of heterogeneity. Remarkably, Crump et al. (2008) proposes a
non-parametric test for subpopulation heterogeneity in the eﬀect of the treatment. Firpo (2007) proposed a
quantile treatment estimation where the heterogeneity is given by the position of unit in the pre-treatment
outcome distribution. Other papers employ more complex techniques to allow both the ﬁrst and second type of
heterogeneity. Among the others, generalized cross-validation statistic (Imai, Ratkovic, et al., 2013), boosting
(LeBlanc and Kooperberg, 2010), Bayesian Additive Regression Trees (Chipman et al., 2010) have been used.
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the eﬀects is both helpful in terms of identiﬁcation and harmful for traditional estimation
methods. We develop an estimation approach able to provide reliable estimates of all the
cascade eﬀects that stem from a given network topology.
Interaction among agents can be modeled in several ways. When the exact topology of
connections is know, one possibility is to consider the peer eﬀects that stem from the given
network structure. There is a large and growing literature on peer eﬀects in economics using
network data.3 The popular model employed in empirical work is the Manski-type linearin-means model (Manski, 1993). Three assumptions underlie this statistical model: (i) the
network is exogenous, (ii) the eﬀects of all peers are equal, (iii) peer status is measured without error. Although these assumptions may be restrictive in empirical analyses, only a few
recent papers consider alternative models and methods in which some of these assumptions
are relaxed. Point (i) has been recently studied by Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013)
and Hsieh and Lee (2011) who propose parametric modelling assumptions and Bayesian inferential methods to integrate a network formation model with the study of behavior over
the formed networks. Point (iii) belongs to another strand of recent literature which looks
at the consequences of peer-group misspeciﬁcation, focusing in particular on sampling issues
(see Chandrasekhar and Lewis, 2011, Liu, Patacchini, and Rainone, 2013 and Liu, 2013a). In
this paper, we consider the speciﬁcation and estimation of a peer eﬀects model when assumption (ii) is removed. Lee and Liu (2010) considers a peer eﬀects model with one endogenous
variable and one adjacency matrix in a multiple network context, with no between-network
interactions. Liu (2013) extends this model to the case of two endogenous variables and one
adjacency matrix. In this paper, we allow the model to have two endogenous variables, two
adjacency matrices, and both within and between-group interactions. We also consider the
generalization to the case of multiple endogenous variables.4 To the best of our knowledge,
we are the ﬁrst to consider models of peer eﬀects where diﬀerent peers are allowed to exert a
diﬀerent inﬂuence and where both within and between groups interactions can be at work.5
We maintain assumptions (i) and (iii).
We show that the multiple group structure of the model requires modifying the conventional identiﬁcation conditions (Bramoullé et al., 2009 and Cohen-Cole et al., 2012) and has
interesting connections with the concepts of chains and Tree-indexed Markov chains (see Benjamini and Peres, 1994).
We propose eﬃcient 2SLS estimators using instruments based on the two reduced forms.
We show that the standard IV approximation (Kelejian and Prucha, 1998, Kelejian and
Prucha, 1999 and Liu and Lee, 2010) involves a huge number of IVs, even if we use a low degree approximation of the optimal instruments.6 For this reason, we consider many-instrument
asymptotics (Bekker, 1994) allowing the number of IVs to increase with the sample size.
Diﬀerently from Lee and Liu (2010) and Liu (2013b) where the many instruments derive
from the multiple network framework, in our model the many instruments derive from the (approximation of the) multiple adjacency-matrix framework. A multiple matrix framework does
not only result in an increasing number of instruments but also yields multiple approximations
3

See Jackson and Zenou, forthcoming 2013, part III, for a collection of recent studies.
There is a long tradition in spatial econometrics looking at spatial autoregressive models with multiple
endogenous variables (see Kelejan and Prucha, 2004). In the spatial econometrics context, however, the
adjacency matrix is the same for all endogenous variables, and no groups are considered.
5
Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013) also estimate a model with two peer eﬀects, but without cross
eﬀects, using a Bayesian estimation method.
6
See Prucha (2013) for a review of Generalized Method of Moments estimators in a spatial framework.
4
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of the optimal instruments. As a result, we show that the form of the many-instrument bias
diﬀers, though the leading order remains unchanged. We also propose a bias-correction procedure. Simulation experiments show that the bias-corrected estimator performs well in ﬁnite
samples. When the number of endogenous variables is allowed to grow, our estimator remains
consistent and asymptotically normal if the number of endogenous variables grows more slowly
than the sample size. Finally, we investigate the bias occurring when the interaction structure is misspeciﬁed. We derive analytically the bias that occurs when only within-group peer
eﬀects are considered, i.e when interactions between groups are at work but ignored by the
econometrician. We then use a simulation experiment to evaluate this bias in ﬁnite samples.
In the last part of the paper we show the empirical salience of our model for policy purposes.
As highlighted by Manski (2013), the policy maker can rarely manipulate peer outcomes. Peer
eﬀects, however, can be seen as a mechanism through which the treatment could propagate
through the networks. If peer eﬀects are at work, then the policy intervention has not only a
direct eﬀect on outcomes but also an indirect one through the outcomes of connected agents
(i.e. the so called ”social multiplier”). We show via Monte Carlo simulations that the presence
of heterogeneous peer eﬀects and between-group interactions may create unexpected, or sometimes paradoxical results if the policy maker ignores the heterogeneity of interactions among
groups. Our results can be helpful to explain why several policy programs do not accomplish
the expected goals.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the econometric model.
Identiﬁcation conditions are derived in Section 3, and in Section 4 we consider 2SLS estimation
for the model. Section 5 investigates the bias occurring when the interaction structure is
misspeciﬁed. We devote Section 6 to show the importance of our analysis for the identiﬁcation
of treatment response with spillovers. We ﬁrst derive estimands for direct, indirect and total
eﬀects of treatment strategies in network settings with interactions. Then we use a simulation
experiment to show the extent to which the heterogeneity of the endogenous eﬀects can aﬀect
the outcome response for diﬀerent groups. Section 7 concludes.
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The Network Model with Heterogeneous Peer Eﬀects

A general network model has the speciﬁcation
Y = φGY + Xβ + G∗ Xγ + ,

(1)

where Y = (y1 , . . . , yn )0 is an n−dimensional vector of outcomes, G = [gij ] is an n × n
adjacency matrix, gij is equal to 1 if i and
j are connected, 0 otherwise. G∗ is the rowP
normalized version of G, where gij∗ = gij / j gij . X is a n × p matrix of exogenous variables
capturing individual characteristics.  = (1 , . . . , n )0 is a vector of errors whose elements are
i.i.d. with zero mean and variance σ 2 for all i. For model (1), φ represents the endogenous
eﬀect, where an agent’s choice/outcome may depend on those of his/her peers on the same
activity, and γ represents the contextual eﬀect, where an agent’s choice/outcome may depend
on the exogenous characteristics of his/her peers. Let X ∗ = (X, G∗ X) and β ∗ = (β, γ).
Let A and B be two countable sets (types) of individuals (e.g. males and females, blacks
and whites) such that A ∩ B = ∅ and n = na + nb is the cardinality of A ∪ B, with na and nb
being respectively
the cardinalities of A and B. Let us deﬁne Y = (Ya0 , Yb0 )0 , X = (Xa0 , Xb0 )0 ,

Ga Gab
and G =
. For instance, the subscript a denotes that Y, X ∈ A, G is formed only
Gba Gb
4

among nodes of type A and the subscript ab denotes the fact that links are directed from b to
a.7 Appendix A deﬁnes regularity conditions.
Model (1) can be written as
∗
Ya = φa Ga Ya + φab Gab Yb + Xa∗ βa∗ + Gab
Xb γab + a ,

(2)

Yb = φb Gb Yb + φba Gba Ya + Xb∗ βb∗ + G∗ba Xa γba + b ,

(3)

where βa∗ = (βa , γa ), Xa∗ = (Xa , Ga∗ Xa ), Xb∗ = (Xb , Gb∗ Xb ) βb∗ = (βb , γb ), and a and b are i.i.d
errors with variance σa2 and σb2 , respectively. Let us suppose for simplicity that σa2 = σb2 = σ.
Model (2) - (3) is a generalization of the standard framework in the sense that it allows
endogenous eﬀects to be diﬀerent within and between groups. If we stack up equations (2)
- (3) and restrict the endogenous eﬀect parameters of the two equations to be the same (i.e.
φa = φb = φab = φba ), then we obtain model (1).
Let us deﬁne the following matrices
∗
Xb γab + a ,
Aδa = Xa∗ βa∗ + Gab
∗
Xa γba + b ,
Bδb = Xb∗ βb∗ + Gba
∗
Xa , b ) and δb = (βb∗ , γba , 1). By
where A = (Xa , G∗ab Xb , a ), δa = (βa∗ , γab , 1), B = (Xb , Gba
plugging Yb in equation (2) we have

(4)
Ya = φa Ga Ya + φab Gab (Jb (φba Gba Ya + Bδb )) + Aδa
= (φa Ga + φab φba Ca )Ya + φab Gab Jb Bδb + Aδa ,
P
k
where Jb = (I − φb Gb )−1 = ∞
k=1 (φb Gb ) provided kφb Gb k∞ < 1, where k·k∞ is the row-sum
matrix norm. The ijth element of Jb sums all k-distance paths from j to i when i, j ∈ B
scaling them by φkb and Ca = Gab Jb Gba .8 Therefore the reduced form of model (2) is
Ya = Ma (φab Gab Jb Bδb + Aδa ),

(5)

where Ma = (I − φa Ga − φab φba Ca )−1 .9 A suﬃcient condition for the non singularity of
(I − φa Ga − φab φba Ca ) is kφa Ga k∞ + kφab φba Ca k∞ ≤ 1. This condition also implies that Ma
is uniformly bounded in absolute value.10
We note that: (i) we present an aggregate model speciﬁcation (i.e. G which multiplies y
in model (1) is not row-normalized), but the approach applies also to an average model (i.e.
More formally, Ya = Ra Y , Xa = Ra X, Ga = Ra GRa0 and Gab = Ra GRb0 , where Ra = (Ina , Ona ,nb ) and
Rb = (Onb ,na , Inb ) are matrices that select the nodes in group a and b respectively. Ok,l is a k × l matrix of
zeros.
8
Ca is a matrix which captures all the indirect connections among nodes of type A passing through one or
more nodes of type B. Note that the ijth generic element of Gab Gba is equal to the number of length-2 paths
directed from j ∈ A to i ∈ A passing through a node l ∈ B. This matrix accounts only for distance-2 indirect
connections while Ca = Gab Jb Gba captures all the paths starting from j ∈ A and ending to a generic node in
B, eventually passing through other nodes of type B and ﬁnally arriving in i ∈ A scaling them by φb .
9
This matrix captures all direct and indirect paths among type A nodes passing through others type A
nodes and type B nodes.
10
The assumption is crucial for identiﬁcation of the model and asymptotic normality of the estimator (see
Appendix A).
7
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when G which multiplies y in model (1) is row-normalized);11 (ii) our model speciﬁcation has
two groups, but all the assumptions, propositions and proofs can be naturally extended to a
ﬁnite number of groups; (iii) we consider a single network, but the approach can be extended
to the case of multiple networks(i.e. a network with several components) with the addition of
network ﬁxed eﬀects in the model speciﬁcation; (iv) we can also add a heterogeneous spatial
lag in the error term a = ρa Wa a + ρab Wab b .12

3

Identiﬁcation

∗
Let us deﬁne Za = (Ga Ya , Gab Yb , Xa∗ , Gab
Xb ). Equation (2) is identiﬁed if E(Za ) has full
13
column rank for large n. In this section, we ﬁnd suﬃcient conditions for E(Za ) to have full
column rank.14 The detailed proof is given in Appendix C.

Proposition 1. Let Xa and Xb have full column rank. If the sequences of {Ma }, {Mb }, {Ja }
and {Ja } are UB matrices,15 then E(Za ) has full column rank in the following cases
1. [(I)]
2. (a)

6 0,
i. βa φa + γa =
ii. Ia , Ga and G2a are linearly independent.
[and]

(b)

6 0,
i. βb φb + γb =
ii. Gab and Gab Gb are linearly independent.

[or]
3. (a)

(b)

i. γab 6= 0,
ii. Gab and Ga Gab are linearly independent.
[and]
i. γba 6= 0,
ii. Ia , Ga and Gab Gba are linearly independent.

Note that conditions (2a) are exactly the same identiﬁcation conditions found by Bramoullé
et al. (2009) in the case of homogeneous eﬀects (i.e. only one group). Proposition 1 here is
more general as it provides alternative possibilities. When more than one group is considered
we do not need linear independence of a particular set of matrices - we have multiple suﬃcient
conditions. Even if Ia , Ga and G2a are linearly dependent we can still identify φa , and the other
11

Aggregate and average models are diﬀerent in terms of behavioral foundations, contextual eﬀects are
supposed to be averages over peers in both cases w.l.o.g. (see Liu, Patacchini, and Zenou, 2014forthcoming).
12
The resulting model is a SARARM AG(p; q; g) with p = 1, q = 1 and g = 2, where p and q are respectively
the number of spatial lags for outcome and error, and g is the number of groups (see Kelejian and Prucha,
2007).
13
This implies that Assumption 4 in Appendix A holds.
14
Symmetric conditions and results hold for equation (3).
15
In practice we need a series expansion to approximate the inversion of the matrices. We are grateful to
Chihwa Kao for pointing it out.
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Figure 1: Identiﬁcation with heterogeneous nodes

parameters, relying on linear independence of chains passing through type B nodes.16 The set
of adjacency matrices’ combinations can be represented as a Tree-indexed Markov chain- the
parameters can be identiﬁed because of the multiple branches of the tree (see Appendix B).
Obviously, if Ga , Gba , Gab and Gb are complete and consequently all products among them are
linearly dependent, then the model remains not identiﬁed. However, if group A nodes are in
a complete network, but the matrices representing between-group interactions are sparse (i.e
Gab and Gba are not complete), then identiﬁcation can be achieved and φa can be estimated
even if Ga is complete. Systems in panels (b) and (c) in Figure 1 can be identiﬁed because
the adjacency matrix of type B nodes (blue nodes in Figure 1) is sparse, whereas systems in
panel (a) and (d) cannot. The additional parameters’ restrictions (condition (2b, 3a or 3b))
are due to an additional vector in the full rank condition (i.e. E(Gab yb )).
Proposition 1 has a natural interpretation in terms of instrumental variables. A multiple group framework adds an extra layer of exclusion restrictions. In fact, multiple sets of
matrices provide additional instruments. The intuition is that when we distinguish nodes in
diﬀerent types, a higher number of possible network intransitivities are formed. Appendix B
provides technical details on the connection between identiﬁcation in a single group model
and a multiple group one.

4

The 2SLS estimator

Equation (2) cannot be consistently estimated by OLS because Ga ya and Gab yb are correlated
with a .17 We consider 2SLS estimation for the model in the spirit of Lee-Liu (2010). Following
the standard technique used in spatial econometrics literature, we have the following optimal
instruments from the two (symmetric) reduced forms
E(Ga ya ) = Ga (Ma (φab Gab Jb E(B)δb + E(A)δa ),

(6)

E(Gab yb ) = Gab (Mb (φba Gba Ja E(A)δb + E(B)δa ).

(7)

16

For example, we can take advantage of linear independence of Ia , Ga and Gab Gba (instead of Ia , Ga and
and Gab and Ga Gba .
From equation (5), Ga ya = Sa (φab Gab Jb Bδb + Aδa ) where Sa = Ga Ma . OLS is not consistent because we
have E((Ga ya )0 , a ) = E((Sa (φab Gab Jb Bδb +Aδa ))0 , a ) = E((Sa a )0 , a ), since we assume that the cov(a , b ) =
6 0. A similar argument holds for Gab yb .
0 and E(a ) = E(b ) = 0. It follows that E((Sa a )0 , a ) = σa2 T r(Sa ) =
G2a );
17
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Recalling that Za = [Ga ya , Gab yb , E(A)] is a n × (k + 2) matrix, we have fa = E(Za ) =
[E(Ga ya ), E(Gab yb ), E(A)], so from equations (6) - (7) we have
Za = fa + va = fa + [(φab Sa Gab Jb b + Sa a ), (φba Sab Gba Ja a + Sab b )][e1 , e2 ]0 ,
where e1 is a ﬁrst unit vector of dimension (k + 2), Sa = Ga Ma and Sab = Gab Mb . These
instruments are infeasible given the embedded unknown parameters. fa can be considered
∗
a linear combination of IVs in H∞
= (Sa (Gab Jb E(B), E(A)), Sab (Gba Ja E(A), E(B)), E(A)).
Furthermore, since Sa = Ga Ma and Sab = Gab Mb provided kφa Ga k∞ + kφab φba Ca k|∞ ≤ 1 and
∞
∞
∞
P
P
P
kφb Gb k∞ < 1, we have Sa = Ga (φa Ga +φab φba Ca )j = Ga (φa Ga +φab φba Gab (φjb Gjb )Gba )j .
j=0

j=0

j=0

The same approximation holds for Sab . It follows that
p
∞
X
X
j j
Ca = Gab Jb Gba = Gab (
φb Gb )Gba = Gab (
φbj Gjb + (φb Gb )p+1 Jb )Gba .
j=0

This implies kCa −

p
P

j=0

φjb Gjb k∞ ≤ k(φb Gb )p+1 k∞ kCa k∞ = o(1) as p → ∞.

j=0
∞
P

Sa = Ga Ma = Ga

(φa Ga +φab φba Ca )j = Ga [

j=0

kSa −

p
P
j=0

p
P

(φa Ga +φab φba Ca )j +(φa Ga +φab φba Ca )p+1 Sa ] →

j=0

(φa Ga + φab φba Ca )j k∞ ≤ k(φa Ga + φab φba o(1))p+1 k∞ kSa k∞ = o(1) as p → ∞. Hence,

the approximation error by series expansion diminishes very quickly in a geometric rate, as
long as the degree of approximation (p) increases as n increases. We can also replace Sa and
Sab by a linear combination. The instruments become
a
H∞
= (Ga (I, Ga , G2a , . . . (Gab (I, Gb , G2b , . . . )Gba )) . . . (Gab (I, Gb , G2b , . . . )E(B), E(A)),
ab
H∞
= (Gab (I, Gb , G2b , . . . (Gba (I, Ga , G2a , . . . )Gab )) . . . (Gba (I, Ga , G2a , . . . )E(A), E(B)),

with an approximation error diminishing very quickly when K (or p) goes to inﬁnity, where K
a
ab
denotes the number of instruments. Let us deﬁne H∞ = [H∞
, H∞
, Xa∗ , Gab Xb ] as the matrix
of instruments and select an na × K submatrix HK based on a p-order approximation of
H∞ .18 For instance, if we use the second order approximation of the inﬁnite sums, HK =
(H2a , H2ab , Xa∗ , Gab Xb ) will be the ﬁrst step best projector. The feasible 2SLS estimator for
model (2) is
µ̂ = (Za0 P̂K Za )−1 Za0 P̂K Ya ,
(8)
0
0
where µ̂ = (φa , φab , βa∗ , γab ) and P̂K = HK (HK
HK )−1 HK
.

4.1

Asymptotic Properties

This section derives the asymptotic properties of the many-instrument 2SLS estimator for
heterogeneous network models. Cohen-Cole et al. (2012) and Liu (2013b) consider a network
model with two endogenous variables and one adjacency matrix with multiple networks.19 Our
18

Note that K is a function of the degree of approximations p.
Kelejian and Prucha (2004) considers SAR models with multiple endogenous variables and a unique weights
matrix.
19

8

network model requires two endogenous variables, and two diﬀerent adjacency matrices.20 In
Lee and Liu (2010) and Liu (2013b), the asymptotic approximation of the 2SLS estimator is
based on many-instrument asymptotics, where the many instruments derive from the multiple
network framework. In our model the many instruments derive from the (approximation
of the) multiple adjacency-matrix framework. A multiple matrix framework results in an
increasing number of instruments due to multiple approximations of the optimal instruments.21
This complicates the derivations of the asymptotic properties of the many-instrument 2SLS
estimator.
The following propositions establish the consistency and asymptotic normality of the manyinstrument 2SLS estimator in equation (8). Regularity conditions together with some discussion can be found in Appendix A. Some useful Lemmas are provided in Appendix B. All the
proofs are listed in Appendix C. Let
1 0 22
fa fa ,
n→∞ n

Fa = lim

PK Sa = Ψa and PK Tba = Ξba , where Tab = Sab Gba Jb .23
Proposition 2. Under assumptions 1-5, if K/n → 0, then

√
n(µ̂ − µ0 − b)

N(0, σa2 Fa−1 ), where b = (Za0 PK Za )−1 [e1 , e2 ]σa2 [tr(Ψa ), φba tr(Ξba )]0 = Op (K/n).
From Proposition 2, when the number of instruments K grows at a slower rate than
the sample size n, the 2SLS estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal. However, the
asymptotic distribution of the 2SLS estimator may not be centered around the true parameter
value due to the presence of many-instrument bias of order Op (K/n) (see, e.g., Lee and Liu,
2010). We note that the leading order of the bias is the same as in Lee and Liu (2010)
and Liu (2013b). However, the structure of the bias diﬀers. Here, it depends on multiple
approximations of the optimal instruments (see the beginning of Section 4). The condition
that K/n → 0 is crucial for the 2SLS estimator to be consistent. This appears evident if
we look at the normal equation of our estimator: n1 Za0 PK (Ya − Za µ̂). When µ̂ = µ0 we have
that E( n1 Za0 PK (Ya − Za µ0 )) = [e1 , e1 ]σa2 [tr(Ψa ), φba tr(Ξba )]0 = Op (K/n) by Lemma B.2 in the
Appendix. This converges to 0 only if the number of instruments grows more slowly than the
sample size.24 N(0,σa2 (limn→∞ n1 fa0 P¯ fa )−1 . Note that (Fa − limn→∞ n1 fa0 P¯ fa ) = limn→∞ fa0 (I −
P̄ )fa , which is positive semi-deﬁnite in general. The 2SLS estimator with ﬁxed number of
instrument is generally not eﬃcient. In order to have eﬃciency, we need to index our matrix
of instruments with K and let K grow more slowly than the sample size. The following corollary
characterizes diﬀerent scenarios for diﬀerent rates in which K diverges from n.
√
Corollary 1. Under assumptions 1-5, (i) if K 2 /n → 0, n(µ̂ − µ0 )
√
N(0, σa2 Fa−1 ); (ii) if K 2 /n → c < ∞, n(µ̂ − µ0 )
√
N(, σa2 Fa−1 ), where b̄ = lim nb.
n→∞

20

We consider the analysis with one network only. The extension to multiple networks extremely complicates
the notation burden, but the theoretical results remain basically unchanged.
21
See Section 4.
22
This is a crucial assumption. See the discussion in Appendix A after Assumption 4.
23
To simplify the notation, we assume that n → ∞ implies na → ∞ and nb → ∞.
24
¯ the asymptotic distribution will be √n(µ̂−µ0 )
Indeed, if we use a ﬁxed number of instruments given by H,
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The many-instrument bias of the 2SLS estimator can be corrected by the estimated leadingorder bias (b) given in Proposition 2. Given consistent estimates of φˆa , φˆb , φˆab , φˆba , σ̂a and σ̂b ,
the bias-corrected 2SLS estimator is
µ̂c = (Za0 PK Za )−1 [Za0 PK Ya − σ̂a2 [e1 , e2 ][tr(Ψa ), φ̂ba (Ξba )]0 ].

(9)

The following proposition shows that the bias-corrected estimator is properly centered around
the normal distribution.
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ
Proposition
3. Under assumptions 1-5,
√
√ if K/n → 0 and φa , φb , φab , φba , σ̂a and σ̂b are
n−consistent initial estimators, then n(µ̂c − µ0 )
N(0,σa2 Fa−1 ) .
In the next subsection we discuss the case in which the number of endogenous variables
(groups) grows with the sample size.

4.2

Estimation with Many Groups

So far, we have assumed that group numerosity does not depend on the sample size. We
believe that, in practice, such an assumption is virtually always satisﬁed. For instance, if we
increase the size of the sample, we will always have two genders: male and female. However,
for completeness it is interesting to explore whether having the number of groups growing
together with the sample size aﬀects the estimator properties.
In the many-instrument literature, Anatolyev (2013) and Imbens, Kolesar, et al. (2011)
have relaxed the assumption of a ﬁxed number of exogenous regressors. To the best of our
knowledge, the implications of relaxing the assumption of a ﬁxed number of endogenous regressors have not been investigated yet.
Let us deﬁne g as the number of endogeneous variables and p as the degree of approximation
(see Appendix C for an intuition of p as length of chains).
The following proposition characterizes the rate of divergence of g from n.
Proposition 4. if K/n → 0, we have that g = o(n1/p ).
This means, that for our estimator to be consistent and asymptotically normal in this
framework with many instruments and many endogenous variables we need g to grow more
slowly than n1/p .
For completeness, let us consider the link between the number of groups (i.e. endogenous
variables) and the many-instrument asymptotics.
In our framework we have that g/K → 0. In order to have a good performance of the
estimator we need K/n → 0. This implies g/n = 1/sg → 0, where sg is the average size
of groups. In words, in order to have a good performance of the estimators, we need the
size of groups to be large enough. Furthermore, in order to have the estimator properly
centered, we need K 2 /n → 0. This implies g 2 /n = g/sg → 0. Therefore, for asymptotic
eﬃciency, the average size of groups needs to be large enough compared to the number of
groups. These results are similar to those in Lee and Liu (2010). However, the framework
in Lee and Liu (2010) considers multiple networks embedded in a block-diagonal adjacency
matrix (i.e. G = diag(Ga , Gb )) with the restriction that the within peer eﬀects are the same
for each network, (i.e. φa = φb ) and there are no interactions between networks . If a network
10

is deﬁned as a group, then our framework can be considered as a generalization. We have
diﬀerent groups, with both within and between-group interactions. Our adjacency matrix is
thus not block-diagonal.

4.3

Finite sample performance

In this section, we use simulation experiments to investigate the performance of the proposed
estimator in small samples.
We conduct a Monte Carlo simulation study based on the following model
ya = φa Ga ya + φab Gab yb + Xa∗ βa + G∗ab Xb γab + a ,
∗
yb = φb Gb yb + φba Gba ya + Xb∗ βb + Gba
Xa γba + b ,

where Xa , Xb and  ∼ N (0, 1). Borrowing from Lee and Liu (2010), we generate the G matrix
as follows. First, for the ith row of G, we generate an integer di ∈ [0, 1, .., m] with a uniform
probability function, where m = 10, 20, 30. Then we set the (i + 1)th , · · · , (i + di )th elements
of the ith row of G to be ones. If (i + di )th < na , the other elements in that row are zeros;
otherwise, the entries of ones will be wrapped around such that the number of di − na entries
of the it h row will be ones. We partition the matrix into four submatrices Ga , Gb , Gab and
Gba with a random selection of rows and correspondent columns. The identiﬁer variable used
to select the two groups is generated by a Bernoulli distribution with p=0.5. The number of
replications is 1000 and na = nb = 500. We perform two experiments that are summarized
in Table 1 and Table 2. Each column reports mean and standard error (in parenthesis) of
the empirical distributions of diﬀerent estimators. The ﬁrst column shows 2SLS few IVs. It
is based on equation (8) with the IV matrix HK derived by the ﬁrst order approximation of
the best instruments (K=24). The second column reports the 2SLS many IVs, it is derived
by the second order approximation of the best instruments (K=84). Finally, Column 3 shows
the 2SLS bias-corrected. It is based on equation (9) with consistent estimates derived from
the 2SLS few IVs.
Table 1 reports on the performance of the estimators when changing the density of the
network, i.e. the number of connections. Each panel represents a diﬀerent value of m, which
indicates the maximum number of connections. The data are generated with βa = βb =
γa = γb = γab = γba = 0.5. The peer eﬀects parameters are set to: φa = φb = 0.1 and
φab = φba = 0.2. The results show that all estimators perform well, with diﬀerent nuances.
In particular, one can observe the trade-oﬀ between bias and eﬃciency for the 2SLS many
IVs when network density increases- the higher the density, the higher the gain in terms of
eﬃciency with respect to the 2SLS few IVs. However, the bias (due to the many instruments)
increases as well. The bias correction that we propose is thus particularly beneﬁcial when the
network is dense.
[IN SERT T ABLE 1 HERE]
Table 2 reports on the performance of the estimators when changing the heterogeneity
within and between-group parameters. The simulation setup remains unchanged, but we now
set the maximum number of connections to 20 and let the φ parameters vary. In the ﬁrst
panel, we consider φa = φab = φb = φba = 0.1 This is the benchmark framework in which
peer eﬀects are homogeneous. In the second panel, we introduce some heterogeneity in the
11

within-group interaction eﬀects. We set φa = φb = 0.1 and φab = φba = 0.3. In the third panel,
peer eﬀects are diﬀerent both within and between groups. We set φa = 0.1, φb = 0.2 φab = 0.4
and φba = 0.05. Table 2 shows that the performance of the estimators does not depend on the
values of the parameters- the ranking of the estimators in terms of eﬃciency and bias remains
unchanged.
[IN SERT T ABLE 2 HERE]
To test the robustness of our results, we have also performed two additional exercises.25
First, instead of using randomly generated networks, we have used the Add Health’s sociomatrix26 as an adjacency matrix, thus replicating features of real-world social networks. Our
aim is to understand whether the results of Table 1 are driven by the random generation of
links. Second, we use uniform and gamma distributions to generate the errors of the data
generating process. In doing so, our aim is to investigate whether and to what extent our i.i.d.
assumption for the error terms in the derivation of large sample properties aﬀects the ﬁnite
sample Monte Carlo results. In both cases, the simulation results are very similar to those
reported here.

5

Model Misspeciﬁcation Bias

In this section, we investigate the bias occurring when the interaction structure is misspeciﬁed.
First, we analytically derive the bias that occurs when only within-group peer eﬀects are
considered, i.e. when interactions between groups are at work but ignored by the econometrician. We then use a simulation experiment to evaluate this bias in ﬁnite samples.
Second, we derive the mapping between the parameters of a model with homogeneous
peer eﬀects and those of a model with heterogeneous peer eﬀects. We then use a simulation
experiment to give an example of parameter mapping when peer eﬀects are believed to be
homogeneous but are actually heterogeneous in the data generating process (DGP).
Let us suppose the econometrician estimates the following model
ya = (I − φa Ga )−1 (Xa βa + G∗a Xa γa + ),

(10)

ya = Ga (Ma (φab Gab Jb Bδb + Aδa ),

(11)

yb = Gab (Mb (φba Gba Ja Aδb + Bδa ).

(12)

whereas the real DGP is

25

Results available upon request.
A matrix derived from observed connections among students in the Add Health, a program project directed
by Kathleen Mullan Harris and designed by J. Richard Udry, Peter S. Bearman, and Kathleen Mullan Harris at
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and funded by grant P01-HD31921 from the Eunice Kennedy
Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, with cooperative funding from 23 other
federal agencies and foundations. Special acknowledgment is due to Ronald R. Rindfuss and Barbara Entwisle
for assistance in the original design. Information on how to obtain the Add Health data ﬁles is available
on the Add Health website (http://www.cpc.unc.edu/addhealth). No direct support was received from grant
P01-HD31921 for this analysis.
26
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This model misspeciﬁcation results in an estimator of the endogenous eﬀect φa that is inconsistent. First, we are omitting the inﬂuence of the outcome of type B agents. Second, we
do not consider the indirect connections among type A nodes passing through type B nodes.
As a result, Gka , with k ≥ 2, is misspeciﬁed. Therefore, the commonly used instrument G2a
might not be valid as the exclusion restrictions might be violated. Third, we misspecify the
contextual eﬀects (G∗a Xa ) by ignoring the characteristics of other-type peers. 27
Analytically, the bias is
E(µˆa ) = µa + E(Za0 Pa Za )−1 Za Pa (φab Gab yb + G∗ab Xb γab ),
where Za = [Ga ya , Xa , G∗a Xa ] and µa = (φa , βa , γa ). The bias is positively correlated with the
direct inﬂuence of type B on type A, as captured by the peer eﬀects from B to A and the
inﬂuence of the characteristics of type B on type A.
Table 3 shows the extent of this bias in ﬁnite samples through a Monte Carlo simulation.
Table 3 represents the performance of the 2SLS few IVs following the same experiment design
as in the previous section.28 We report on the case in which the maximum number of connections is 10 for each node (as in panel 2 of table 1).29 The ﬁrst column reports the real value
of the parameters. The second column shows the performance of the 2SLS estimator in the
misspeciﬁed model. When interactions between groups are at work but ignored by the econometrician it results in the size of the bias derived above. The third column shows the results of
the estimator when the econometrician considers the correct DGP (equations (11) and (12)),
but does not use the approximation of optimal instruments (in equation (8)). In other words,
we consider the case where the traditional network IV approach is applied mechanically, thus
G2a Xa and Gab Gb Xb are used as instruments respectively for Ga Ya and Gab Yb . In short, only
within-group instruments are considered. The resulting 2SLS estimator is consistent but not
eﬃcient. The fourth column reports the performance of our 2SLS few IVs (in equation (8)),
which considers the Hk matrix derived in Section 4(i.e which also includes between group
instruments).30 Mean values for each coeﬃcient’s empirical distribution and standard errors
(in parenthesis) are reported.
Table 3 shows that the bias is large in the second column, especially for the β coeﬃcients.
In the second column the bias is not large, but the problem is eﬃciency. Our approach (third
column) reveals no bias and improved eﬃciency.
[IN SERT T ABLE 3 HERE]
In our second exercise, we consider the case in which the econometrician estimates a
standard network model (model (1)) when the real DGP is characterized by heterogeneous
peer eﬀects (model (11) - (12)).
Let us deﬁne the following n × n matrices
27

This issue also arises when full information about node characteristics and network structure is not available. See Chandrasekhar and Lewis, 2011, Liu, Patacchini, and Rainone, 2013 and Liu, 2013a for problems
related to the use of sampled network data.
28
We use the 2SLS few IVs to ease the comparison of 2SLS estimators with the misspeciﬁed set of instruments.
Observe that the bias considered here is due to the misspeciﬁcation of the model rather than to the manyinstrument issue.
29
The simulation results in the other cases, i.e. when the maximun number of simulations is 20 or 30, are
very similar.
30
First order approximation of optimal instruments is considered.
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Ga Oab
G(a) =
, G(ab) =
Oba Ob



Oa Oab
G(ba) =
, G(b) =
Gba Ob

Oa Gab
Oba Ob



Oa Oab
Oba Gb



,
,

where Ol is a l × l matrix of zeros and Olk is a l × k matrix of zeros. Let us suppose for
simplicity that β = βa = βb and γ = γa = γab = γba = γb and focus our attention on the peer
eﬀects parameters. In this case model (1) can be written as
Y

= φGY + Xβ + G∗ Xγ + 
= (φa G(a) + φab G(ab) + φba G(ba) + φb G(b))Y + Xβ + G∗ Xγ + .

(13)

Hence, the peer eﬀects parameter, φ, is the following non-linear function of heterogeneous peer
eﬀects
φ = φa G−1 G(a) + φab G−1 G(ab) + φba G−1 G(ba) + φb G−1 G(b).
If φa = φb = φab = φba = φ, then
φa G(a) + φab G(ab) + φba G(ba) + φb G(b) = φ(G(a) + G(ab) + G(ba) + G(b)) = φG.
Table 4 contains the results of a simulation experiment in which we estimate model (13), for
diﬀerent values of φa , φb , φab and φba . The simulation set-up is as before- the data generating
process remains as in equations (11) and (12)). The estimator considered is the 2SLS few IVs.
In the ﬁrst column, we set all the φ parameters equal to 0.1. In fact, the 2SLS few
IVs consistently estimates φ = φa = φb = φab = φba . In the second column, we add some
heterogeneity. We set φab = 0.3 and φba = 0.3, leaving the other parameters unchanged. The
third column corresponds to the case in which all the φ parameters are diﬀerent. As expected,
as soon as some heterogeneity is introduced, the estimated value of φ is not informative at all.
[IN SERT T ABLE 4 HERE]

6

Impact Evaluation and Treatment Eﬀect

Let us now highlight the importance of our analysis for the identiﬁcation of treatment response
with spillovers. Let A be the set of eligible recipients and B the set of ineligible recipients of
a treatment (respectively eligibles and ineligibles hereafter). The treatment is administrated
using a randomized controlled experiment. Having in mind policy interventions such as conditional cash transfer or microﬁnance subsidies can be useful. Let Ta be the binary treatment
vector whose ith element is Ta,i = {0, 1}, which indicates whether i is treated or not (among
the eligibles).31 Model (2) and (3) can be written as
∗
Ya = φa Ga Ya + φab Gab Yb + Xa∗ βa∗ + δa Ta + ρa Ga Ta + Gab
Xb γab + a ,
31

(14)

Our analysis can be easily adapted to the case of continuous or multinomial treatment. It is also useful
to recall an assumption already listed in the previous sections for estimator properties, G ⊥ Ta , which here
states that the treatment does not change the network topology. This assumption relates to Manski (2013)
which assumes that reference groups are person-speciﬁc and treatment-invariant (unable to be manipulated
by the policy maker).
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Yb = φb Gb Yb + φba Gba Ya + Xb∗ βb∗ + G∗ba Xa γba + Gba Ta ρba + b .

(15)

In this model, the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA)32 doesn’t hold because
(i) spillovers are at work and (ii) spillovers are heterogeneous. To the best of our knowledge,
there are no studies that consider violations of the SUTVA because of (ii). This is surprising
given that heterogeneity in spillovers is naturally implied by diﬀerences between eligibles and
ineligibles.
Our results in Sections 4 provide consistent and eﬃcient estimators for the parameters of
model (2) - (3).33

6.1

Average Treatment Eﬀect with Heterogeneous Spillovers

The Average Treatment Eﬀect in our context can be written as34
AT E = E(Yi |i ∈ A, Ta,i = 1, X, G) − E(Yi |i ∈ A, Ta,i = 0, X, G).

(16)

From the reduced form of equation (14)
AT E = δa EET (ma,ii ),

(17)

where ma,ii is the iith element of Ma and EET (·) = E(·|i ∈ A, Ta,i = 1, X, G) indicates the
expected value over the treated eligibles. The Average Treatment Eﬀect is thus equal to the
direct impact of the treatment on the individual i (i.e. δa ) plus the indirect eﬀect of other
agents’ spillovers on i triggered by i’s treatment (but not triggered by other nodes’ treatment)
δa Ma = δa Ia + δa

∞
X
(φa Ga + φab φba Ca )k .
k=1

Observe that ma,ii is a function of (Ga , Gb , Gab , Gba , φa , φb , φab , φba ). This implies that when
network interactions are at work, the AT E depends on network topology and strength of
outcome spillovers among agents. As a result, an individual can have a high increase in
outcome even if she has a low treatment direct impact (a low δa ) but she is central in the
network.35 Observe that even if δa,i = δa ( i.e. the treatment eﬀect is homogenous) the AT E
can be heterogeneous because of the diﬀerent position of nodes in the network. Indeed, the
AT E can be decomposed into two parts
AT E = δa + δa EET [(diag(Ma − Ia )] .
|{z} |
{z
}
DTE

(18)

FLTE

32

Following Rubin (1986), SUTVA states that potential outcomes depend on the treatment received, and
not on what treatments other units receive and that there are no ”hidden treatments”.
33
As mentioned in the Introduction, we do not consider direct treatment eﬀect heterogeneity. This assumption can be relaxed, allowing for a double form of heterogeneity: one coming from individual characteristics,
the other from the interactions. The identiﬁcation becomes much more complex. We leave this extension for
future research. Following Manski (2013), we also assume here that the treatment does not change the network
topology, i.e. that the policy maker cannot manipulate reference groups.
34
When the treatment is a randomized control experiment, the average treatment eﬀect is equal to the
average treatment eﬀect on treated.
35
Of course the centrality itself is not a suﬃcient condition, a high level of spillovers is required.
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The ﬁrst part is the Direct Treatment Eﬀect (hereafter DT E), whereas the second part is the
eﬀect of the treatment due to the interactions among agents, i.e. the eﬀect of i’s treatment
that impact i through other nodes. We denote the latter eﬀect as Feedback Loop Treatment
Eﬀect (hereafter F LT E). The sample counterpart of equation (18) is
1
1 X
ATˆ E = µ0t [δˆa diag(M̂a )]µt t = δˆa t
mˆa,ii ,
na
na
T

(19)

i∈Na

where NaT is the set of treated individuals which has cardinality nta < na , µt is the nta × 1
selector vector for that units and M̂a = Ma (φˆa , φ̂b , φˆab , φˆba ) is the estimated counterpart of
Ma .
Treatment Eﬀect Misinterpretation and Bias When SUTVA holds, AT E = DT E.
If interferences are at work, then AT E =
6 DT E. However, the problem is not only about
interpretation. We show below that if spillovers are ignored, then the parameter estimates
can be inconsistent. Suppose that a treatment is administered to nta < na subjects and we
ignore interactions among them. Estimation of δa is based on the following regression
Ya = Xa βa + Ta δa + ∗a ,

(20)

where ∗a = ρa Ga Ta + φa Ga Ya + φab Gab Yb + a contains the three relevant spillover eﬀects omitted:36 (i) the direct treatment spillover from other eligibles ρa Ga Ta , (ii)the endogenous outcome spillover from other treated eligibles φa Ga Ya and (iii) the endogenous outcome spillover
from ineligibles φab Gab Yb . Misinterpretation occurs because the estimate of δa is interpreted
as a DT E while, if the data generating process is given by equations (14) and (15), it is an
AT E. Bias can occur if the treatment is correlated with the three components listed above
δˆa = δa + bias = δa + (Ta0 Ta )−1 Ta

{ ρa Ga Ta
+ φa Ga Ma [φab Gab Jb (ρba Gba Ta ) + Ta δa + ρa Ga Ta ]
+ φab Gab Mb [φba Gba Ja (δa Ta + ρa Ga Ta ) + ρba Gba Ta ]}.

The bias is due to the spillover eﬀects coming from the three omitted components listed
before. By correctly specifying the interaction structure we can consistently estimate the
direct treatment eﬀect purged of the inﬂuence of the three omitted components.
It should appear clear from our discussion that, if the spillovers’ coeﬃcients and the direct
treatment eﬀect are positive, neglecting between and within-group interactions result in an
overestimation of the direct treatment eﬀect. Manski (2013) deﬁnes this scenario as Reinforcing Interactions. Of course one can imagine diﬀerent scenarios where interactions are not
reinforcing and, on the contrary, are Opposing Interactions.
Our approach has an advantage from this point of view- it allows interactions between
and within groups to be heterogeneous (e.g. Reinforcing Interactions within groups members
and Opposing Interactions between groups). We also note that, using again Manski (2013)’s
terminology, our framework can be adapted to the estimation of social interaction with leaders
and followers, labeling those agents as groups A and B.
36

∗
The other omitted terms, Xa∗ βa∗ and Gab
Xb γab , are independent from the treatment.
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6.2

Indirect Treatment Eﬀect

As mentioned before, the Indirect Treatment Eﬀect (hereafter IT E) has been an object of
interest in several papers. Most of the existing papers focus attention on the indirect eﬀect
on ineligibles (see, e.g. Angelucci and De Giorgi, 2009). However, when the population is
split into two sets, it is also natural and interesting from a policy perspective to understand
whether diﬀerent types of untreated (eligible or ineligible), are diﬀerently impacted by the
treatment. Let us deﬁne IT EE and IT EI as the Indirect Treatment Eﬀect on Eligibles and
the Indirect Treatment Eﬀect on Ineligibles, respectively.
The Indirect Treatment Eﬀect on Eligibles in our model is
IT EE = E(Yi |i ∈ A, Mi T =
6 0 ∩ Ta,i = 0, X, G) − E(Yi |i ∈ A, Mi T = 0 ∩ Ta,i = 0, X, G), (21)
whereas the Indirect Treatment Eﬀect on Ineligibles can be deﬁned as
(22)
IT EI = E(Yi |i ∈ B, Mi T =
6 0, X, G) − E(Yi |i ∈ B, Mi T = 0, X, G),

 
−1
Ia
Ga φa Gab φab
where Mi is the ith row of M =
−
, T = [Ta , 0b ], and 0b is a
Gba φba Gb φb
Ib
nb × 1 vector of zeros. Mi T = 0 indicates that i is not aﬀected by any of the treated nodes (i.e.
that there are no direct and indirect paths in the networks between i and a treated node).
Let us now suppose that, given our data generating process (equations (14) and (15))
we are asked by a policy maker to evaluate the Indirect Treatment Eﬀects after a treatment
administered to the eligibles (i.e. to a subset of A). From model (14) - (15) we can derive the
following formulas
IT EE = EEu [Mai (φab Gab Jb (ρba Gba Ta ) + δa Ta + ρa Ga Ta )],
IT EI = EI [Mbi (φba Gba Ja (δa Ta + ρa Ga Ta ) + ρba Gba Ta )],
6 0, X, G)
where Mai is the ith row of Ma , Mbi is the ith row of Mb , EI (·) = EI (·|i ∈ B, Mi T =
indicates the expected value over the (indirectly treated) ineligibles, and EEu (·) = E(·|i ∈
A, Mi T 6= 0 ∩ Ta,i = 0, X, G) indicates the expected value over (indirectly treated) untreated
eligibles. Observe that these estimands depend on direct and indirect connections because
of network-based spillovers. More formally, they can be decomposed into diﬀerent parts.
For instance, IT EE may be decomposed into three eﬀects. The ﬁrst term , δa Ma , captures
propagation of the treatment via outcome spillovers.37 .
The nice feature of this derivation of IT EI and IT EE is that instead of simply addressing
the question whether an IT E is diﬀerent from zero, we can also decompose it into diﬀerent
sources of treatment’s transmission. For instance, one can ﬁnd that the treated population
Given that Ma = (I −φa G−φab φba Ca )−1 , we have Ma δa = Ia δa +[(Ia −φa G−φab φba Ca )−1 −I]δa . The ﬁrst
term is the diagonal matrix of treatment direct eﬀects which has (by deﬁnition) no impact on the untreated,
while the second term represents the propagation of those eﬀects through the network via endogenous spillovers
(i.e. changes in outcomes due to treatment). The second term, ρa Ma Ga , measures the spillover arising from
the treatment given to other units (ρa Ga ), as well as its ampliﬁcation through interactions (as captured by
Ma ). Finally, φab ρba Ma Gab Jb Gba , denotes the spillover accruing to ineligibles distinguished between outcome
ampliﬁcation (Ma Gab Jb ) and (indirect) treatment eﬀect (ρba Gba ). A similar decomposition can be applied to
IT EI
37
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has a strong reaction to the treatment (δa and ρa are high) and transmits it to ineligibles
through low magnitude peer eﬀects (φab is low). The same level of IT EI, however, can also
arise from a scenario where there is a low reaction to the treatment within group (δa and ρa
are low) and a large transmission between groups (φab is high).
Understanding these diﬀerent channels is paramount for policy purposes. Most importantly, our framework enables the researcher to distinguish the role of contextual eﬀects from
peer eﬀects in transmitting the treatment. In other words, one can quantify how much of
the eﬀect is generated by the direct eﬀect of the treatment through exogenous variables (as
captured by δa , ρa and ρba ) and how much is due to spillovers through outcomes (as captured
by φba , φa , φb and φab ). Note also that having these estimates at hand, one can understand
which eﬀects (within eligibles, within ineligibles and between them) are the dominant ones in
spreading out the policy’s beneﬁcial eﬀect.
We can thus simply use the sample counterpart to estimate the IT EE and IT EI
ˆ a (φˆab Gab Jˆb (Gba γ̂ba ) + βˆa + Ga γ̂a )]µu
IT ˆEE = µ0u [M

1
,
nua

ˆ b (φˆba Gba Jˆa (βˆa + Ga γˆa ) + Gba γb̂a )]ιa 1 ,
ITˆEI = ι0b [M
nb
u
where na < na is the number of eligibles who are untreated, µu is the na × 1 selector vector
for that units and ιl is an nl × 1 vector of ones.

6.3

Total Treatment Eﬀect

One can also be interested in evaluating the treatment eﬀect on the entire population (or
network). As the SUTVA has been removed and spillovers are in place, it is useful to derive
the Total Treatment eﬀect (hereafter T T E). Following our previous notation we have the
following deﬁnition for T T E
T T E = E(Yi |i ∈ A ∪ B, Mi T =
6 0, X, G) − E(Yi |i ∈ A ∪ B, Mi T = 0, X, G).
This represents the treatment eﬀect on a generic individual in the network (eligible or ineligible). Its sample counterpart is

T Tˆ E = ι0



Ia
Ib




−

Ga φˆa Gab φˆab
Gba φˆba Gb φ̂b

−1  
 


1
Ta
Ga ρ̂a Gab
Ta
ˆ
δa
+
ι ,
Ob
Gba ρ̂ba Gb
Ob
n

where ι is an n × 1 vector of ones. Note that the T Tˆ E is basically the weighted average of
ATˆ E, IT ˆEE, and ITˆEI.

6.4

Control Group

It is well-known that the AT E, IT EE, IT EI and T T E are identiﬁed if we have a control
group, i.e. if we can distinguish sample of units who are not treated (directly or indirectly).
This can be quite challenging when estimating the indirect treatment eﬀects. In a network
context, we have two possibilities: (i) a multiple network-based approach and (ii) topologydriven approach.
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Figure 2: Topology-driven policy evaluation design

In the ﬁrst case, we have multiple networks, some of which are randomly treated and others
which are not- oﬀering a valid control group. A similar scheme is often followed for policy
design and evaluation in a non-network context.38
The second possibility is unique to a network approach and exploits the architecture of
networks. When information on actual connections is available and the direction is known,
it may be possible to estimate AT E, IT EE, IT EI and T T E using only one network. The
network topology determines the possibility of having the control population if there are some
nodes in the network that are not inﬂuenced by a treatment to other nodes. For example,
let us consider the network in Figure 2, where the red nodes are treated and the blue ones
are not. According to the directions of the edges (arrows in the picture), the blue node i
is inﬂuenced by red nodes whereas the blue node j is not. Therefore, the direction of the
links between nodes stemming from this network topology allows us to distinguish between
indirectly treated nodes (node i) and control group nodes (node j).39

6.5

Policy Experiments

Manski (2013) studies treatment response in settings with endogenous eﬀects. In this framework, endogenous eﬀects are seen as a mechanism in which the treatments could propagate.40
The main objects of interest are P [Y ] and P [Y (Ta )], the outcome distributions respectively
without and with a treatment Ta administered to the population. Policy makers are usually
interested in comparing these two distributions since interventions are often ﬁnalized to reduce
inequality between a disadvantaged cluster and the rest of the population. The marginal eﬀect
of T on Y accounts for the adjustment of the outcome after a policy intervention.
In this paper, we consider a network framework with heterogeneous peer eﬀects similar
to Manski (2013).41 In this section, we numerically study the empirical density functions
P [Ya ] − P [Ya (Ta )] and P [Yb ] − P [Yb (Ta )], where the subscripts indicate the reference to eligible
and ineligible populations.
We perform a numerical simulation to asses the extent to which the underlining heterogeneity of the endogenous eﬀects can aﬀect the outcome response for diﬀerent groups. Our
goal is to provide evidence about the individual and aggregate implications of this heterogeneity. In the simulation experiment below, we show that for some values of φa , φb , φba and φab it
38

For example, in PROGRESA, a set of treated and untreated villages are surveyed (see Angelucci and De
Giorgi (2009) for more details on the program design).
39
Note also that we need these two kinds of nodes to be comparable in terms of characteristics.
40
If a dynamic model is at work, then a social multiplier may also arise in terms of expectations.
41
The framework in Manski (2013) considers only one group, thus homogeneous peer eﬀects (and no between
group interactions).
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may be (paradoxically) more convenient to treat a group other than the target one. This has
implications for the study of socio-economic inequality. Importantly, by allowing estimation
of all the diﬀerent parameters of interest, our model speciﬁcation can be used to understand
what nodes (or which type of nodes) should be targeted by a social planner whose ﬁnal goal
is to maximize an aggregate outcome or to converge to a desired distribution of individual
outcomes.
We present an experiment where we treat a random sample of nodes and simulate the
treatment’s propagation through a network characterized by heterogeneous peer eﬀects. More
speciﬁcally, we look at the increase of type A and type B nodes’outcomes once a certain set
of nodes receives a treatment42 .
Two exercises are implemented. In the ﬁrst, we evaluate aggregate eﬀects, i.e. the change
in the sum of outcomes (for both type A and type B individuals) which follows a treatment
for diﬀerent values of peer eﬀects (i.e. φa , φb , φba , φab ). In the second exercise, we look at
distributional eﬀects, i.e. at changes in the empirical distribution of individual node outcomes
for diﬀerent sets of peer eﬀects parameters following the policy intervention .
Figures 5 and 6 report on the ﬁrst exercise. Figure 5 depicts the results when ﬁxing φb =
φba = 0.1 and varying φa and φab . We generate a grid of values for parameters resulting from
two sequences: φa = 0.02, 0.04, ..., 0.50 and φab = 0.02, 0.04, ..., 0.50. For each couple (φa , φab )
we generate one hundredP
independent replications
using the same DGP as described in Section
P
s
s
4.3 and compute Ya = i∈A yi and Yb = i∈B yi . We then select a random sample of one
hundred type A nodes to be treated. This treatment is represented by an na × 1 vector
P Ta of
zeros for non treated nodes and ones for treated nodes. Finally, we compute Yas∗ = i∈A yi∗
P
∂yi
and Ybs∗ = i∈B yi∗ , where yi∗ = yi + ∂T
TA . This exercise represents the case where group A
a
nodes are treated and there are low interactions between nodes A and nodes B (φba = 0.1).
From equations (14) and (15) we have
Δyi = yi∗ − yi =

n
∂yi
Ta =
∂Ta

Mai (φab Gab Jb (ρba Gba Ta ) + (δa + Ga ρa )Ta )
Mbi (φba Gba Ja (δa + ρa Ga )Ta + ρba Gba Ta )

if i ∈ A
if i ∈ B

.

P ∂Ya
Figure 5 represents the diﬀerences ΔYas = Yas∗ − Yas =
T and ΔYbs = Ybs∗ − Ybs =
∂Ta a
P ∂Yb
T for all the possible combinations (φa , φab ).43
∂Ta a
Figure 5 shows that ΔYas increases steadily with φa (and slightly with φab ), whereas ΔYbs
remains roughly unchanged. These results are not surprising. If there are no interactions (or
low interactions) between the two groups, then there is no reason why the outcome of group
42

We compute the marginal eﬀect matrix of Ta on Ya multiplied by the treatment vector
∂E(Ya |G, X)
Ta = Ma (φab Gab Jb (ρba Gba Ta ) + δa Ta + ρa Ga Ta ).
∂Ta

Note that when there are no interactions between the two groups (or only type A nodes are considered in the
a |G,X)
analysis), we have ∂E(Y∂T
Ta = Sa (δa Ta + ρa Ga Ta ), where Sa = (I − φa )−1 . This is the marginal eﬀect
a
matrix in a standard peer eﬀects model.
The marginal eﬀect matrix of Ta on Yb is
∂E(Yb |G, X)
Ta = Mb (φba Gba Ja (δa Ta + ρa Ga Ta ) + ρba Gba Ta ).
∂Ta

(23)

Observe that the marginal eﬀect of Ta on Ya is diﬀerent from the marginal eﬀect of Ta on Yb -an increase in
Ta diﬀerently aﬀects nodes depending on their type.
43
Some combinations are missing in the grid because it is unlikely to draw Ga and Gab such that kφa Ga k∞ +
kφab φba Ca k|∞ ≤ 1. These combinations are at the edge of the parameter space.
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B should change. The variation in the outcome of the group A depends on the extent of the
endogenous eﬀects (φa ). If instead there are interactions between the two groups, then the
treatment response depends on both φa and φab . For example, assuming a positive eﬀect of
the independent variable, if a policy intervention targets a group when the two groups have
the same outcome proﬁle, we expect an increase in inequality in terms of outcomes between
the two types when the within-peer eﬀects (φa ) are high and the between-peer eﬀects (φab )
are low.
[IN SERT F IGU RE 5 HERE]
Figure 6 depicts the results when ﬁxing φb = φab = 0.1, and varying φa and φba . The
experiment design remains unchanged. This exercise represents the case where group A nodes
are treated and there are increasing inﬂuences within nodes A and from nodes A and nodes B
(φba increasing up to 0.5). Figure 6 shows that an increase of φba is beneﬁcial for ΔYbs , as type B
nodes receive an impulse from type A nodes. Interestingly, type B nodes may actually beneﬁt
even more than A nodes (the treated group). Our results shows that when φba > 0.20, we
observe ΔYbs > ΔYas . In terms of policy eﬀects, this means that if a policy targets one group
but peer eﬀects between groups are high, then we can observe increasing inequality between
the two groups, rather than the expected decrease (assuming that the targeted group has a
lower starting outcome). In terms of the estimands derived in Section 6 , note that the blue
surfaces in Figures 5 and 6 are simply IT EI ×nb while the red ones are IT EE ×nua +AT E ×nta ,
plotted for diﬀerent combinations of parameters.
[IN SERT F IGU RE 6 HERE]
In the second exercise, we consider four points from the grid formed by φa and φba and
look at the empirical distributions of Δyi∈A and Δyi∈B . We estimate these distributions using
a normal kernel density. We consider the case where φa = 0.1 and φba = 0.1 as a benchmark
and then increase the strength of peer eﬀects among agents in diﬀerent ways.
In Figure 7 we increase the eﬀect within group A only (φa = 0.3.). While this change is
irrelevant for type B nodes, it has interesting implications for the distribution of outcomes
among type A nodes (Panel a). While in the benchmark model (the single line), the distribution is quasi-bimodal (due to the treated and non-treated A nodes), an increase of φa smooths
the distribution (the bold line). In other words, the higher the endogenous eﬀects, the more
evenly the beneﬁts of the policy intervention are shared among nodes (individuals).
[IN SERT F IGU RE 7 HERE]
In Figure 8 we increase the between-group eﬀect only (φba = 0.3). Type A density remains
basically unchanged (Panel a) . The impact is instead apparent on the outcome distribution
of type B nodes (Panel b). One can observe an important shift to the right. This means that
non treated type B nodes beneﬁt more than non-treated type A nodes ( from the treatment
to type A nodes).
The red and blue curves in Figures 7 and 8 are the empirical density functions P [Ya (Ta )−Ya ]
u
E×nta
and P [Yb (Ta ) − Yb ], respectively. They have IT EE×nan+AT
and IT EI as expected values.
a
[IN SERT F IGU RE 8 HERE]
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7

Concluding Remarks

We generalize the linear-in-means model to the presence of two groups and between-group
interactions. We derive the suﬃcient conditions to identify the model and propose eﬃcient
2SLS estimators. We characterize the bias which arises when interactions are ignored and
evaluate it in ﬁnite sample using simulation experiments. We illustrate the relevance of these
issues for policy purposes. If peer eﬀects are seen as a mechanism in which the treatments could
propagate through the networks, then accounting for heterogeneous peer eﬀects and betweengroup interactions can be helpful in designing and evaluating policy interventions that alter the
outcome distribution. We show that when between-group interactions are strong, an impulse to
a given group can engender beneﬁts to another group which are even higher than those accruing
to the target group. Examples of types of interventions where the local non-target population
may also be indirectly aﬀected by the treatment through social and economic interaction
with the target population are widely varied. For example, the recipients of conditional cash
transfers may share resources with ineligible households who live in the same community or
with extended family members, which could aﬀect the incentives to accumulate human capital
(Angelucci et al., 2010). School vouchers or other incentives (such as equipment provision) to
increase schooling of indigent children may increase the learning ability of untreated children if,
for example, textbooks or computers are shared among classmates. A number of organizations
promote the deworming of children in the developing world as a public health and development
strategy. Supplying deworming drugs to a group of children may beneﬁt untreated children
by reducing disease transmission, thus lowering infection rates for both groups.
In sum, our paper contributes to the literature by providing a framework able to decompose
the treatment response into diﬀerent components, including the crucial diﬀerence between
endogenous eﬀects and eﬀects stemming from exogenous variations in the characteristics of
the treated.
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APPENDIX
Appendix A: Assumptions and Discussions
Let us introduce some notation and assume the following regularity conditions: a sequence
of square matrices {A}, where A = [Aij ], is deﬁned ”uniformly bounded in absolute value”
(UB) if there
P exists a constant cb < ∞ (that does
Pnnot depend on n) such that kAk∞ =
maxi=1,··· ,n nj=1 |Aij | < cb and kAk1 = maxj=1,··· ,n i=1
|Aij | < cb . We indicate that {A} is
bounded only in row (column) sum absolute value as UBR (UBC). For the sake of simplicity
we will assume that n → ∞ implies na → ∞ and nb → ∞.
Assumption 1. The elements of a and b are iid with zero mean, variance σa2 and σb2 respectively, and zero covariance. Moments higher than the fourth exist.
Assumption 2. The elements of Xa and Xb are uniformly bounded constants, Xa and Xb
have full rank k, and lim n1a Xa0 Xa and lim n1b Xb0 Xb are ﬁnite and non singular.
na →∞

nb →∞

Assumption 3. The sequences of matrices {Ga }, {Gab }, {Gb }, {Gba }, {Ma }, {Mb }, {Jb },
and {Ja } are UB.
The ﬁrst assumption is needed in order to apply the Kelejian and Prucha (2001) Central
Limit Theorem (CLT) of a linear and quadratic form. Assumption 2 is standard in the
literature. Assumption 3 is exploited in Kelejian and Prucha (1999) to limit the spatial
dependence among the units. It rules out any spatial unit root case. As Lee (2004) pointed
out, it plays an important role in the derivation of asymptotic properties of the estimators
for spatial econometric models. It guarantees that the variance of Ya and Yb is bounded as
n goes to inﬁnity. Observe that this assumption is also crucial for the identiﬁcation of the
heterogeneous network model, as shown in Proposition 1.
Assumption 4 is a suﬃcient condition for identiﬁcation of the social network model. For
assumption 4 to hold, E(Za ) must be full column rank for large enough na .
Assumption 4. Fa = lim n1 fa0 fa is ﬁnite and a full rank matrix, Fb = lim n1 fb0 fb is ﬁnite
n→∞
n→∞
and a full rank matrix.
Since the variance of the structural error is var(va ) and the concentration parameter (which
measures the instrument’s strength) is fa0 fa /var(va ), this assumption implies that the concentration parameter grows at the same rate as the sample size. Such a rate is assumed in
Bekker (1994). Hence, we assume that the instruments are stronger than assumed in the
weak-instrument literature.44 For the sake of brevity we focus on equation (2), and we imply
the same argument holds for equation (3).
Assumption 5. There exists a K × (k + 2) matrix ΘK such that
as n, K → ∞.
44

1
kE(Za )
n

− HK ΘK k2 → 0

See Staiger and Stock, 1997 or Baltagi et al., 2012 for a panel data version of weak-instrument asymptotics.
Another interesting extension could be to derive the estimator’s asymptotic properties under many weak
instruments. In doing so, we are allowing the rate of concentration parameter to be diﬀerent than the rate of
the sample size. Consequently, we can compare it with the rate in which K increases. See for example, Chao
and Swanson (2005)
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Following Lee and Liu(2010), assumption 5 requires that the (infeasible) best IV matrix
can be well approximated by a certain linear combination of the feasible IV matrix HK as the
number of instruments increases with the sample size. Once we assume this, we can deal with
the approximation of Sa and Sab . We have to approximate this matrix since we cannot use it
as matrix of instruments because it is formed by unknown parameters. If HK has the following
structure then assumption 5 holds and we can obtain eﬃciency under certain conditions.
(p)

a(p)

b(p)

Proposition 5. If kφa Ga k∞ +kφab φba Ca k∞ < 1, let us deﬁne HK = (HK , HK , Xa∗ , Gab Xb )
where
a(p)

= (Ga (Ga , (Gab (Gb , . . . , Gp+1
)Gba ), . . . , (Ga (Ga , (Gab (Gb , . . . , Gp+1
)Gba )p+1 (E(A), Gab Jb B),
b
b

b(p)

= (Gab (Gb , (Gba (Ga , . . . , Gpa+1 )Gab ), . . . , (Gb (Gb , (Gba (Ga , . . . , Gpa+1 )Gab )p+1 (E(B), Gba Ja A),

HK

HK

(p)

where p is an increasing integer valued function of K, there exists a K × (k + 2) matrix ΘK
(p) (p)
such that kfa − HK ΘK k∞ → 0 as n, K → ∞.

Therefore, the 2SLS estimator can be asymptotically eﬃcient when we use an increasing
number of instruments.
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Appendix B: Some Useful Lemmas
Lemma 1. Recall that Za = fa + va . Let ef = n1 fa0 (I − PK )fa . As K/n = O(1): (i) T r(ef ) =
√
o(1) (ii) va0 PK va = Op (K). (iii) fa0 PK va = Op ( nK). (iv) ef = O(tr(ef )). (v) n1 Za0 PK Za =
1 0
f f − ef + n1 fa0 PK va + n1 va0 PK fa + n1 va0 PK va = Op (1).
n a a
Proof. (i) See lemma B.3 (i) in Lee and Liu (2010).
0
(ii) Let us write va0 PK va = 0a Sa0 PK Sa a + 0b Jb0 G0ba Sab
PK Sab Gba Jb b . Let us focus on the ﬁrst
0 0
0 0
term of the sum, since E|a Sa PK Sa a | = E[tr(|a Sa PK Sa a |)] = σa2 tr(|PK Sa Sa0 PK |) = O(K)
by lemma B.2 (ii) Lee and Liu (2010), then by Markov’s Inequality P r(|a Sa0 PK Sa a |) ≥ α) ≤
E(|a Sa0 PK Sa a |)
= Op (K).
α
For the second part of the sum, given also that Sab Gba Jb = Tab where Tab is UB, we can
apply the same proof and obtain the same order of probability. We then have O(f(x))+
O(f(x))=O(f(x)).
p
p
(iii) For each j we have by Cauchy-Schwarz inequality |e0j fa0 PK va | ≤ ej0 fa0 fa ej a Sa0 PK Sa a =
√
√
√
O( n)Op ( K) = Op ( nK).
(iv) By lemma A.3 (ii) in Donald and Newey (2001).p
(v) n1 Za0 PK Za = n1 fa0 fa − O(tr(ef )) + Op (K/n) + Op ( K/n) = Op (1).
Lemma 2. Recall that Za = fa + va , let PK Sa = Ψa and PK Tba = Ξba . As K/n = O(1): (i)
0
0
2
E(va0 PK a ) = σa2 [e1 , e2 ][tr(Ψa ), φˆba (Ξba )]0 . (ii)E(v
va ) = σa4 tr
([(Ψa ), (Ξbap
)]) + O(K).
a PK a a PK√
p
p
0
0
2
0
(iii) [Z
√a PK a −[σa [e1 , e2 ][tr(Ψa ), φ̂ba tr(Ξba )] / (n)] = fa a / n+Op ( K/n)+Op ( tr(ef )) =
fa0 a / n + Op (1).
Proof. (i) E(va0 PK a ) = [e1 , e2 ]E([(φab Sa Gab Jb b + Sa a ), (φba Sab Gba Ja a + Sab b )]0 )PK a =
0
0
Sab
PK a )]0 = σa2 [e1 , e2 ][tr(Ψa ), φˆba tr(Ξba )]0 .
[e1 , e2 ][E(0a Sa0 PK a ), E(φba 0a Ja0 Gba
(ii) By lemma A.2 in Lee (2001), E(va0 PK a 0a PK va ) = E([0a (Ψa )a 0a (Ψa )a , 0a Ξba a 0a Ξba a ]) =
X
(µa4 − 3σa4 )
[(Ψa ), φba (Ξba )]2ii + σ04 [[tr2 (Ψa ), φba tr(Ξba )]+
i

tr([(Ψa ), φba (Ξba )]0 [(Ψa ), φba (Ξba )] + tr([(Ψa )2 , (Ξba )2 ])]
= σa4 tr2 ([(Ψa ), (Ξba )]) + O(K),

where the last equality holds by Lemma B.2 (ii) in Lee and Liu (2010).
p
(iii) Since Za0 PK  = fa a −fa0 (I−PK )+va PK , then (Za0 PK a −σa2 [e1 , e2 ][tr(Ψa ), φ̂ba tr(Ξba )])0 / (n) =
√
√
√
fa0 a / n − fa0 (I − Pa )/ n + [va0 PK a − σa2 [e1 , e2 ][tr(Ψa ), φ̂ba tr(Ξba )]0 ]/ n.
√ 0
By
Lemma
1
above
and
by
Lemma
B.2
(ii)
in
Lee
and
Liu
(2010)
nfa (I − Pa )a =
p
Op ( (T r(ef ))). By Lemma 2 (i), (ii) and Markov’s inequality for variance we have √1n [va0 PK a −
p
σa2 [e1 , e2 ][tr(Ψa ), φ̂ba (Ξba )]0 = Op ( K/n).
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Appendix C: Proofs
Proof of proposition 1. We need to prove that E(Za ) = (E(Ga ya ), E(Gab yb ), Xa , Ga Xa , Gab Xb )
is full column rank. This means that if E(Ga ya )d1 +E(Gab yb )d2 +Xa d3 +Ga Xa d4 +Gab Xb d5 = 0
then d1 = d2 = d3 = d4 = d5 = 0, where d1 , d2 , d3 , d4 , d5 are parameters.
By inserting the deﬁnitions of E(Ga ya ) and E(Gab yb ) we have:
Ga (Ma (φab Gab Jb E(B)δb + E(A)δa )d1 +Gab (Mb (φba Gba Ja E(A)δb + E(B)δa )d2
+Xa d3 + Ga Xa d4 + Gab Xb d5 = 0.
More explicitly,
Ga (Ma (φab Gab Jb (Xb βb + GXb γb + Gba Xa γba ) + Xa βa + GXa γa + Gab Xb γab )d1
+Gab (Mb (φba Gba Ja (Xa βa + Ga Xa γa + Gab Xb γab ) + Xb βb + Gb Xb γb + Gba Xa γba )d2
+Xa d3 + Ga Xa d4 + Gab Xb d5 = 0 (24)
.
Let us assume that Ja , Jb , Ma and Mb are invertible and thus
∞
P
(φa Ga )k ,
Ja = (φa Ga )−1 =
k=0

−1

Jb = (φb Gb )

=

∞
P

(φb Gb )k ,

k=0

Ma = (φa Ga + φab φba Gab Jb Gba )−1 =
Mb = (φb Gb + φba φab Gba Ja Gab )−1 =

∞
P

(φa Ga + φab φba Gab

∞
P

(φb Gb )k Gba )j ,

j=0

k=0

∞
P

∞
P

(φb Gb + φba φab Gba

j=0

(φa Ga )k Gab )j .

k=0

Going back to equation (24), we obtain
∞
∞
∞
X
X
X
j j
j
(φb Gb )Gba ) (φab Gab
(φb Gb )k (Xb βb + Gb Xb γb + Gba Xa γba ))
Ga ( (φa Ga + φab φba Gab
j=0

j=0

k=0

+Xa βa + Ga Xa γa + Gab Xb γab )d1
∞
X

∞
X

j=0

k=0

+Gab (

(φb Gb + φba φab Gba

(φa Ga )k Gab )j (φba Gba

∞
X

(φa Ga )k (Xa βa + Ga Xa γa + Gab Xb γab ))+

k=0

(25)
Xb βb + Gb Xb γb + Gba Xa γba )d2
+Xa d3 + Ga Xa d4 + Gab Xb d5 = 0 .
The left side of the previous equation is the sum of products of the matrices Ga , Gba , Gab and
Gb times Xa or Xb weighted by diﬀerent parameters.45
Let us deﬁne J = (k, p, m) and C(c(1) ∈ A, ·, ..., c(l) ∈ B, J). C is a set of paths, hereafter
called a chain,46 of length l which starts from A and ends at B, having k links from a type
45

The matrices sequence is multiplied by Xa or Xb depending on the last interaction matrix. For instance
is multiplied by Xb while Gb Gba is multiplied by Xa .
In this notation a chain includes all possible paths that have common features. For instance, all of paths
starting from A and arriving to B are in the same chain.

G2a Gab
46
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B node to another type B node, p links from a type A node to another type A node, and
m links between nodes of diﬀerent types. The concept of chain is particularly useful in our
context. Indeed, the product of adjacency matrices contains the same information of a chain.
For instance Ga ≡ C(c(1) ∈ A, c(2) ∈ A, k = 0, p = 1, m = 0) and Ga Gab ≡ C(c(1) ∈
A, c(2) ∈ A, c(3) ∈ B, k = 0, p = 1, m = 1). A similar characterization can be written for all
combinations (products) of adjacency matrices considered in equation (25).
Taking advantage of this notation, the system in equation (25) can be characterized by the
following two matrices
⎡


C=

Ca
Cab

⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
 ⎢
⎢
⎢
=⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣

⎤
Ia
Ga
G2
a
·
Gk
a
·
Gab Gba
·
Gab Gb Gba
·
Gab Gk
b Gba
·
Ga Gab Gb Gba
·
Gla Gab Gk
b Gba
Ga Gab Gb Gba
·
l
Gk
a Gab Gb Gba

·
C(c(1)≡A,·,c(l)≡A,J)
·
Gab
Ga Gab
·
k
Ga
Gab

·
Gab Gb
·
Gab Gk
b
·
Ga Gab Gb Gba Gab Gba
·
Gla Gab Gk
b Gba Gab Gba
·
Gab Gb Gba Ga Gab
·
l
Gab Gk
b Gba Ga Gab

·
C(c(1)≡A,·,c(l)≡B,J)

⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥

⎥
⎥
⎥,Θ =
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦

⎡

Θa
Θab

⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
 ⎢
⎢
⎢
=⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣

·

d1

d2

d5

d4

d3

0

0

0

0

1

βa

0

0

1

0

βa φa +γa

0

0

0

0

·

·

·

·

·

(βa φa +γa )φk−1
a

0

0

0

0

·

·

·

·

·

0

γba

0

0

0

·

·

·

·

·

0

γba φb

0

0

0

·

·

·

·

·

0

γba φk
b

0

0

0

·

·

·

·

·

βa φba φab φb φa

0

0

0

0

·

·

·

·

·

l
βa φba φab φk
b φa

0

0

0

0

βb φba φab φk
b

0

0

0

0

·

·

·

·

·

βb φba φab φk
b

0

0

0

0

·

·

·

·

·

f (θ,J)g(Φ,J)

f (θ,J)g(Φ,J)

0

0

0

·

·

·

·

·

0

βb

1

0

0

γab

0

0

0

0

·

·

·

·

·

γab φk−1
a

0

0

0

0

·

·

·

·

·

0

(γb +βb φb )

0

0

0

·

·

·

·

·

0

(γb +βb φb )φk−1
b

0

0

0

·

·

·

·

·

γba φba φab φb

0

0

0

0

·

·

·

·

·

γba φl−1
φba φab φk
a
b

0

0

0

0

·

·

·

·

·

0

βb φba φab φa φb

0

0

0

·

·

·

·

·

0

βb φba φab φla φk
b

0

0

0

·

·

·

·

·

f (θ,J)g(Φ,J)

f (θ,J)g(Φ,J)

0

0

0

·

·

·

·

·

⎤
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⎥
⎥
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⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
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⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
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⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥,
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦

where C represents diﬀerent products of Ga , Gba , Gab and Gb (chains) appearing in the left side
of equation (25) and Θ collects the relative coeﬃcients. Θ has ﬁve columns which distinguish
the elements that are multiplied by d1 , d2 , d3 , d4 or d5 .
The lower panel represents chains starting from A and arriving to B (labeled as Cab ),
while the upper panel collects chains starting from A and coming back to A (labeled as
Ca ). The generic element of Θ is deﬁned by the following objects, θ = (θa , θb ), where θa =
(βa , γa , γab ) and θb = (βb , γb , γba ); Φ = (φba , φab , φb , φa ) and f (θ, J) = βa IJ,βa (βa )+γa IJ,γa (γa )+
γab IJ,γab (γab ) + βb IJ,βb (βb ) + γb IJ,γb (γb ) + γba IJ,γba (γba ) is a set of indicator functions that take
value one ifQ
the argument
Q l Qappears inmthe corresponding chain and zero otherwise. The function
k
g(Φ, J) = k φb l φa m (φba φab ) keeps track of the number of times the relative chain
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passes from one type of node to another scaled by the respective interaction parameters.
Observe that (d1 , d2 , d3 , d4 , d5 )0 Θ0 H∞ = 0 is equal to the condition E(Ga ya )d1 + E(Gab yb )d2 +
Xa d3 + Ga Xa d4 + Gab Xb d5 = 0. The elements of H∞ are equal to the elements of C multiplied
by Xa or Xb depending on the last interaction matrix.47
From C and Θ one can argue that the model is identiﬁed in the cases listed in Proposition
1.
Let us focus on case (2). For E(Za ) to have full rank, it suﬃces that Θ has full rank. This
means that we need the linear independence of at least ﬁve chains (rows of C), translating to
the linear independence of Ia , Ga , G2a , Gab and Gab Gb . 48 The corresponding ﬁve rows of Θ
are thus linear independent. Additionally we need to have ﬁve linear independent columns of
Θ, so having βa φa + γa =
6 0 and βb φb + γb =
6 0 suﬃces to reach the full rank condition for Θ
and consequently E(Za ). The same argument applies for case (3).

Relationship with chains and trees. In the proof of Proposition 1 we have established the
equivalence between sequences of products of adjacency matrices and the concept of chains.
In order to provide a better intuition behind the multiple suﬃcient conditions argument note
that, according to the proof of Proposition 1 notation, a set of chains with a certain length p
can be divided in g p+1 number of chains, where g is the number of node types. For instance,
chains of length 1 can be classiﬁed in four categories when nodes are split into two types.
following proof notation we can deﬁne C(1) ≡ C(c(1) ≡ a, c(2) ∈ A, 0, 1, 0) ∪ C(c(1) ∈
B, c(2) ∈ B, 1, 0, 0) ∪ C(c(1) ∈ A, c(2) ∈ B, 0, 0, 1) ∪ C(c(1) ∈ B, c(2) ≡ a, 0, 0, 1) (e.g.
Ga ∪ Gb ∪ Gab ∪ Gba = G).
We can see this system of chains as a tree, more speciﬁcally as a Tree-indexed Markov
chain. A tree is a graph with a distinguished vertex x0 ∈ g (here a type A node, the starting
point) and the degree of each vertex is at least two (in our case the number of types, g). Its
structure is basically determined by a countable set of states (in our case the number of types,
g) characterized by a transition probability ({p(x, y)|x, y ∈ g} in our case).49
Let Ta := ∪l,J C(c(1) ∈ A, ·, c(l), J) (Figure 3), it is simply the collection of all possible
chains of all possible lengths starting in a type A node. For identiﬁcation purposes, we simply
need that Ga , Gb , Gab and Gba are not empty (and not full).50 In words, it means that there
are no reasons why two randomly drawn nodes cannot be connected for each combination type
(or that each node is connected with all of other nodes).51
47

Note that H∞ is the IV matrix considered in Section 4, which is approximated by HK in the feasible 2SLS
estimation.
48
Note that here we need at least three chains from Ca and two from Cab because we are considering the
outcome equation for type A nodes, i.e. the staring point of chains is always a type A node.
49
Given that here we are not interested in determining the transition probability law of a chain, even if it is
simple to estimate and is basically the link formation probability considered for all of the possible combinations
of nodes’ type. Benjamini and Peres (1994) give a detailed discussion on Tree-indexed Markov chain.
50
It is equivalent to say that the probability 0 < P (gij = 1) < 1, i ∈ A, B and j ∈ A, B. Note that transition
probability can be derived from Ga , Gb , Gab and Gba . Here we are simply excluding the classical linear in
mean framework (when the matrices are complete) and the case in which there are no connections (when the
matrices are empty).
51
From a Markov Chain perspective again, a more restrictive condition consists in assuming that the underlying Markov Chain is irreducible and aperiodic. This means that type A are connected with type B or type
A with the same probability (and the same holds for type B). Thus, in this case tree branches with the same
length have the same probability of being observed. The aperiodicity and irreducibility are not necessary for
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Figure 3: Tree of Chains when type A and B nodes are considered (or have connections)

Figure 4: Non-tree of chains when only type A nodes are considered (or have connections)

An interesting feature of this framework is that, as case (3) tells us, even if Ia , Ga , and
G2a are linearly dependent, we can still identify φa and the other parameters relying on linear
independence of chains passing through type B nodes.52 In other words, we can identify the
parameters because of the multiple branches of the tree (see Figure 3).53
Comparison with the identiﬁcation conditions for homogeneous models. Let us
conclude this discussion by further highlighting the connection between identiﬁcation in a
single group model and in a multiple group one. Let us reproduce a single group model by
considering only type A nodes. The model is
ya = φa Ga ya + βa Xa + γa Ga Xa + a .

(26)

), Xa , Ga Xa ) to have full rank. Given that
In order to obtain identiﬁcation we want (E(Ga yaP
∞
E(Ga ya ) = Ga (I −φa Ga )−1 (βa Xa +γa Ga Xa ) = Ga j=0
(φa Ga )j (βa Xa +γa Ga Xa ), the matrices
used in the proof of Proposition 1 can be written in the following way
the identiﬁcation condition to hold, but of course are suﬃcient.
52
Holding condition (3) instead of (2). We basically take advantage of linear independence of Ia , Ga and
Gab Gba instead of G2a
53
The additional parameter restrictions (conditions (2b, 3a or 3b) in Proposition 1) are basically due to an
additional vector in the full rank condition (i.e. E(Gab yb )).

31

⎡
⎡

C=



Ca



⎢
⎢
⎢
=⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣

Ia
Ga
G2a
·
Gka
·

⎤

⎢
⎢
⎢
⎥
⎢
⎥
⎥

 ⎢
⎥ , Θ = Θa = ⎢
⎢
⎥
⎢
⎥
⎢
⎦
⎢
⎣

0
βa
βa φa + γa
·
(βa φa + γa )φk−1
a
·

0
1
0
·
0
·

1
0
0
·
0
·

⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥.
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦

As before, these two matrices respectively represent the chains and their coeﬃcients. According to the proof of Proposition 1, the full rank condition for (E(Ga ya ), Xa , Ga Xa ) depends on
C and Θ. From C and Θ one can argue that the model is identiﬁed if (see proof of Proposition
1 for details)
1. βa φa + γa =
6 0,
2. Ia , Ga and G2a are linear independent.
These are exactly the conditions of Proposition 1 in Bramoullé et al. (2009). Note that
if Ia , Ga and G2a are linearly dependent, then Gka is also linearly dependent ∀k. Given that
here we cannot diﬀerentiate nodes, we have Ia ≡ C(0), Ga ≡ C(1), and G2a ≡ C(2), where
C(k) represent the set of chains with length k. In terms of chains it means that C(k) ≡
{C(k − 1), C(1)} ≡ {C(k − 2), C(2)} ≡ · · · ≡ {C(2), C(k − 2)} ≡ {C(1), C(k − 1)}. In words
it means that each chain’s set can be represented by at least two sets of chains. So each Gka
can be represented by the product of two matrices, Ga Gak−1 , G2a Gk−2
a , and so on. This is the
connection to the linear independence of Ia , Ga , and G2a as a condition for identiﬁcation. In
this case, a length l set of chains cannot be separated by node type, and thus Ta is composed
only of one chain (Figure 4) instead of multiple chains (Figure 3).54 Therefore, we need Ia ,
Ga , and G2a to be linearly independent in order to have at least three independent chains in
C and consequently identify the model’s parameters satisfying the restriction βa φa + γa =
6 0.
Proof
2. By the classical expansion the estimator is
√ of proposition
n(µ̂ − µ0 ) = n1 (Za0 PK Za )−1 √1n Za0 PK a . As Za = fa + va , by Lemma 1 (v), we have
p
1
0
0
0
2
(Z
P
Z
)
=
F
+
o
(1).
By
Lemma
2
(iii)
[Z
P

−
σ
[e
,
e
][tr(Ψ
),
φ̂
(Ξ
)]
]/
(n) =
K
a
a
p
K
a
1
2
a
ba
ba
a
a
a
n
√
d
0
2
fa a / n + op (1) → N (0, σa Fa ) by CLT.
Hence, the proposition is derived by Slutzky theorem
1 0
1
d
(Za PK Za )−1 √ Za0 PK  → Fa−1 · N (0, σa2 Fa ) = N (0, σa2 Fa−1 ).
n
n

Proof of proposition 3. Given the proof of Proposition 2, it is suﬃcient to show that
√
σ̂a2 [e1 , e2 ][tr(Ψa ), φ̂ba (Ξba )]0 / n = op (1).
54

Borrowing from Markov chains vocabulary again, this is because the state that characterizes the chain is
only one (A).
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ˆ a − Ma = M
ˆ a (φˆa − φa )Ga +
If we ﬁx Ca , then by Lemma C.12 in Lee and Liu (2008) M
M̂a ((φ̂ab φ̂ba −φab φba )Ca ). So we can write, tr(Ψ̂a )−tr(Ψa ) = tr(PK (Sa (φ̂)−Sa ) = tr(PK (Ga (M̂a −
ˆ a (φˆa − φa )Ga + M
ˆ a ((φˆab φˆba − φab φba )Ca ) = (φˆa − φa )tr(PK (Ga (M
ˆ a Ga ) +
Ma ) = tr(PK (Ga (M
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
(φba φba − φab φba )tr(PK (Ga (Ma Ca )).
Since the product of UB matrices is still UB
√ (Kelejian and Prucha 1998), using the lemma
B.2√
(ii) in Lee and Liu (2010) and √
the initial n consistency assumption, we obtain
ˆ a Ga )+ n(φˆba φˆba −φab φba )tr(PK (Ga (M
ˆ a Ca ))/n = op (1)O(K/n)+
n(φˆa −φa )tr(PK (Ga (M
op (1)O(K/n) = oP (K/n).
√
Finally, we have n(σ̂a2 − σa2 )(tr(Ψ̂a ) − tr(Ψa ))/n = op (1)op (K/n) = op (K/n) = oP (1) as
√
K/n → 0. The same procedure can be applied for n(σ̂b2 − σb2 )(tr(Ξ̂a ) − tr(Ξa ))/n and for
the second element of the stacked vector v.
Proof of proposition 4. Let p be a ﬁnite integer. Let us deﬁne the number of instruments
equal to
K=

P
X

g p + o(1),

p=1

PP

so that we have n=1 g p = O(g p ). Since we assume K/n → 0, we have
assumption. This implies that g p = o(n). It follows that g = o(n1/p ).

PP

p=1

a(p)

g p = o(n) by
b(p)

Proof of proposition 5. We prove this proposition for HK . The same applies for HK .
(p)
Let ΘK be the matrix of true parameters derived from the p-order expansion of Θ (see Section
3). If supkφa Ga k∞ + supkφab φba Ca k∞ < 1, then
(p)

(p)

HK ΘK = Ga

p
X

(φa Ga + φab φba Cak )j (φab Gab Jb E(B)δb + E(A)δa ).

j=0
(p)

(p)

It follows that kfa − HK ΘK k∞ = k(φa Ga + φab φba Cak )p+1 Sa (φab Gab Jb E(B)δb + E(A)δa )k∞ ≤
k(φa Ga + φab φba Cak )p+1 k∞ kSa k∞ kφab Gab Jb E(B)δb + E(A)δa k∞ = o(1) as p → ∞.
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Appendix D: Tables and Figures

Table 1: Monte Carlo Simulation: 1000 obs., 1000 replications
10 max connections
φa = 0.1
φab = 0.2
βa = 0.5
γa = 0.5
γab = 0.5
20 max connections
φa = 0.1
φab = 0.2
βa = 0.5
γa = 0.5
γab = 0.5

(1)
2SLS ﬁnite IVs
0.100(0.032)
0.201(0.031)
0.501(0.047)
0.503(0.081)
0.496(0.079)
2SLS ﬁnite IVs
0.098(0.025)
0.197(0.023)
0.501(0.048)
0.506(0.096)
0.500(0.097)

(2)
2SLS large IVs
0.100(0.026)
0.201(0.026)
0.501(0.047)
0.502(0.078)
0.496(0.075)
2SLS large IVs
0.098(0.020)
0.195(0.019)
0.501(0.048)
0.506(0.093)
0.497(0.093)

(3)
2SLS bias-corrected
0.099 (0.027)
0.197(0.069)
0.501(0.048)
0.503(0.076)
0.500(0.097)
2SLS bias-corrected
0.100(0.020)
0.200(0.019)
0.501(0.048)
0.503(0.093)
0.496(0.093)

30 max connections 2SLS ﬁnite IVs 2SLS large IVs 2SLS bias-corrected
0.099(0.020)
0.098(0.016)
0.099(0.016)
φa = 0.1
0.198(0.019)
0.195(0.015)
0.199(0.015)
φab = 0.2
βa = 0.5
0.500(0.048)
0.501(0.047)
0.501(0.047)
0.506(0.110)
0.507(0.107)
0.505(0.107)
γa = 0.5
0.500(0.112)
0.498(0.109)
0.497(0.109)
γab = 0.5
Note: yb is generated with φb = 0.1, φba = 0.2, βb = 0.5, γb = 0.5, γba = 0.5

Table 2: Monte Carlo Simulation: 1000 obs., 1000 replications
20 max connections
φa = 0.1
φab = 0.1
βa = 0.5
γa = 0.5
γab = 0.5
Note: yb is generated

(1)
(2)
(3)
2SLS few IVs 2SLS many IVs 2SLS bias-corrected
0.099(0.040)
0.095(0.032)
0.097(0.032)
0.101(0.038)
0.101(0.031)
0.099(0.031)
0.501(0.047)
0.505(0.047)
0.501(0.047)
0.504(0.084)
0.506(0.081)
0.506(0.080)
0.497(0.083)
0.497(0.078)
0.498(0.078)
with φb = 0.1, φba = 0.1, βb = 0.5, γb = 0.5, γba = 0.5

20 max connections
φa = 0.1
φab = 0.3
βa = 0.5
γa = 0.5
γab = 0.5
Note: yb is generated

2SLS few IVs 2SLS many IVs 2SLS bias-corrected
0.097(0.029)
0.097(0.022)
0.103(0.022)
0.298(0.027)
0.298(0.021)
0.302(0.021)
0.501(0.048)
0.501(0.048)
0.501(0.048)
0.506(0.077)
0.506(0.075)
0.501(0.075)
0.500(0.076)
0.500(0.072)
0.496(0.072)
with φb = 0.1, φba = 0.3, βb = 0.5, γb = 0.5, γba = 0.5

20 max connections
φa = 0.1
φab = 0.4
βa = 0.5
γa = 0.5
γab = 0.5
Note: yb is generated

2SLS few IVs 2SLS many IVs 2SLS bias-corrected
0.099(0.016)
0.097(0.010)
0.091(0.452)
0.390(0.012)
0.370(0.008)
0.401(0.064)
0.501(0.048)
0.501(0.048)
0.502(0.079)
0.505(0.074)
0.504(0.073)
0.502(0.073)
0.498(0.070)
0.478(0.069)
0.498(0.582)
with φb = 0.2, φba = 0.05, βb = 0.5, γb = 0.5, γba = 0.5
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Table 3: Monte Carlo Simulation: 1000 obs., 1000 replications, 10 max connections, φb =
φab = φba = 0.3 ,βb = 0.5 ,γb = γab = γba = 0.5

φa = 0.3
βa = 0.5
γa = 0.5

2SLS/Misspeﬁcied model
0.3684 (0.0335)
0.3856 (0.1804)
-0.0016 (0.2315)

2SLS/misspeciﬁed IVs
0.2971 (0.0465)
0.4865 (0.2233)
0.4929 (0.2102)

2SLS/correct model-correct IVs
0.2999 (0.0164)
0.5097 (0.1489)
0.4963 (0.1765)

Table 4: Monte Carlo Simulation: 1000 obs., 1000 replications, 10 max connections

φ
β
γ

(1)
φa = φb = φba = φab = 0.1
0.100(0.020)
0.500(0.031)
0.446(0.022)

(2)
φa = φb = 0.1 ,φba = φab = 0.3
0.178(0.021)
0.499(0.034)
0.445(0.024)

(3)
φa = 0.1, φb = 0.2, φba = 0.05 , φab = 0.4
0.205(0.022)
0.499(0.033)
0.442(0.025)

Figure 5: Policy experiment: varying φa and φab
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Figure 6: Policy experiment: varying φa and φba

Figure 7: Kernel density estimation of empirical distributions of Δyi∈A and Δyi∈B , increasing φa .
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Figure 8: Kernel density estimation of empirical distributions of Δyi∈A and Δyi∈B , increasing φba .
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